Guo Jian took notes as Khenpo Sonam Tenphel, speaker for the Tibetan parliament-in-exile, met with pro-democracy activists in 2017 in Dharamshala, India, and mentioned China’s repressive insurance policies in opposition to the Tibetan minority.
A naturalized German, Guo, then 36, sporting glasses and a conventional white khata scarf, his hair in a buzz lower, was a part of a delegation of Chinese language democracy advocates from Europe.
Over a couple of days, Guo met and took images with the chief of a Tibetan girls’s affiliation, the Tibetan parliamentarian and even the Dalai Lama, who’s thought of a non secular chief by Buddhists worldwide and a “separatist” by the Chinese language authorities.
Tibetan media celebrated the activists as “Chinese language supporters of the Tibet marketing campaign.” However within the weeks following Guo’s return to Germany, the place he lived, some Chinese language dissidents who typically organized pro-democracy occasions with him started to develop suspicious about his conduct.
Chinese language dissidents abroad usually take precautions to guard their identities from potential authorities surveillance. They typically use nicknames, don’t share personal data with strangers, and talk solely via safe, encrypted channels.
Guo started to interrupt these unstated guidelines. He turned unusually deferential towards a number of the activists in his circle, insisting on visiting them at their personal residences, Tienchi Martin-Liao, a human rights advocate from Taiwan, advised the Worldwide Consortium of Investigative Journalists.
Guo additionally inquired concerning the Dalai Lama’s well being and particulars of the non secular chief’s upcoming journeys to Europe, stated Martin-Liao, who, like Guo, is a part of the Federation for a Democratic China and was involved with Tibetan authorities representatives. “So we [became] somewhat bit alert,” she stated.
Regardless of uncertainties about Guo’s motives, the members of the group appointed him secretary common, because the group’s older technology of activists hoped he would be a part of its management someday, Martin-Liao stated. Described by the extra senior activists as “low key” and “quiet,” and as “aggressive” and “assured” by youthful ones, Guo helped throughout their conferences, caring for the logistics, choosing up worldwide company on the airport and shopping for meals for the occasion contributors.
“We wished him to belong to the core [of the organization] however, after a sure time, we observed that his conduct was not fairly proper,” Martin-Liao stated.
They weren’t the one ones with doubts. In 2023, when Guo tried to influence youthful activists to assist him arrange pro-democracy occasions, he insisted on figuring out their actual names, growing their suspicions about him, sources acquainted with the occasions advised ICIJ.
Their fears materialized final 12 months when German authorities arrested Guo, accusing him of being a Chinese language authorities spy since 2002.
Unbeknownst to Martin-Liao and different activists, months after the journey to Dharamshala, Guo had accompanied far-right German politician Maximilian Krah to China, German media reported, and later turned an aide to the member of the European Parliament in Brussels.
Guo, who denied wrongdoing, advised the German information web site t-online, that, “as a local Chinese language” he cares about “German-Chinese language friendship.” ICIJ’s makes an attempt to contact Guo via e-mail and telephone have been unsuccessful.
Within the aftermath of Guo’s arrest final 12 months, Krah stated in a press release on social media that he was not conscious of the aide’s alleged hyperlinks to the Chinese language intelligence providers. He has additionally denied wrongdoing.
As a part of the continued case, German federal prosecutors allege that Guo leaked greater than 500 paperwork, together with categorised information on European Parliament proceedings, to China’s intelligence providers for years and gathered data on political figures and dissidents in 2023 and 2024. Belgian authorities stated they’re additionally investigating the matter.
Guo is certainly one of many Chinese language nationals to be accused by Western authorities of working for China’s spy companies and infiltrating anti-Communist Occasion teams world wide. Authorities within the U.S, Canada and different democratic nations have additionally accused former regulation enforcement officers and personal investigators from these international locations of actively collaborating with the alleged spies and enabling their surveillance and intimidation efforts.
The findings are a part of China Targets, an ICIJ investigation in collaboration with 42 media companions, which particulars Chinese language authorities’ ways to observe, intimidate and threaten political opponents and the failure of inter-governmental establishments in countering state-sponsored repression.
ICIJ and its companions discovered that Beijing’s technique to silence regime critics additionally depends on right-wing social media teams in overseas international locations, skilled hackers, employees of Chinese language nongovernmental organizations with entry to United Nations proceedings and members of China’s diaspora linked to the CCP-linked United Entrance Work Division.
The alleged use of civilians like Guo, the activist and businessman-turned-political aide, is one more instrument within the Chinese language authorities repression playbook, consultants say.
It additionally reveals the “great” extent of China’s repression efforts, based on Nicholas Eftimiades, a retired U.S. intelligence officer and creator of the e book “Chinese language Espionage Operations and Techniques.”
“They’re reaching out globally in each option to try to destroy opposition, and intelligence is certainly one of them,” Eftimiades stated.
At a information convention in Beijing final 12 months, a spokesman for China’s International Ministry, Wang Wenbin, dismissed the espionage allegations in opposition to Guo as “media hype” supposed to smear China. “The so-called ‘risk of Chinese language spies’ isn’t a brand new factor in Europe,” Wang stated. “Let me stress that China carries out cooperation with European and all different international locations on the premise of mutual respect and non-interference in one another’s inside affairs.”
German prosecutors declined to reply ICIJ’s questions and make clear why they accused Guo of spying on Chinese language pro-democracy advocates solely throughout the 12 months previous to his arrest. ICIJ has examined web sites of teams he was concerned with and spoken to a number of activists who organized pro-democracy occasions with him in addition to others who met him briefly. They confirmed that his involvement with critics of the Chinese language Communist Occasion goes again greater than a decade.
Now, dissidents who attended conferences Guo helped arrange concern that he might have used these occasions to collect contributors’ personal particulars and move them to Chinese language authorities.
“I apprehensive about this, as a result of while you do preparations for a convention you may have everybody’s data,” stated a Canada-based activist who goes by the identify Sheng Xue, who met Guo at a number of occasions. “He was very cautious, very quiet, very alert. Throughout conferences he stayed on the facet, taking a look at individuals.”
Martin-Liao, the activist who participated in occasions alongside Guo, stated that whereas his conduct was alarming, they’d no proof that he could possibly be a undercover agent.
“We all know that some individuals are actually suspicious,” and could possibly be working for the Chinese language authorities to “discover out what occurs, who’s who and so forth,” Martin-Liao stated. “However we’re simply regular individuals, we’re not police or safety [officers].”
“If anyone is gathering data for the Chinese language authorities, they be a part of our convention and get all the knowledge, who was there, who’s the principle host,” she stated. “The Chinese language authorities desires to know every little thing.”
A number of governments, together with the U.S., New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey and Australia, have investigated dozens of suspects allegedly concerned in Chinese language covert operations focusing on dissidents lately. In some instances authorities discovered that the targets of espionage later ended up in jail or had members of the family threatened.
Final week, the leaders of the Group of Seven assembly in Kananaskis, Canada, issued a joint assertion condemning transnational repression “as an necessary vector of overseas interference” and pledged to spice up cooperation to guard their sovereignty and the focused communities.
“It has actual life penalties,” Eftimiades stated. “China is efficient in destroying opposition, just because they encourage that kind of concern and mistrust inside these communities.”
Work for us or ‘we’ll destroy you’
The Chinese language authorities has additionally turned victims into perpetrators.
Shadeke Maimaitiazezi, a 60-year-old textile dealer from Kargılık, Xinjiang, is at present sitting in an isolation cell in Istanbul, the place he was lately convicted of spying on fellow Uyghurs on behalf of the Chinese language state. He has denied the allegations and accused Turkish authorities of forcing him to provide a press release underneath duress, his lawyer Fatih Davut Ejder advised ICIJ’s media companion Deutsche Welle Turkey.
Maimaitiazezi, a Muslim, has 5 youngsters, together with three who nonetheless reside in Xinjiang, the Chinese language province the place many Uyghurs reside and the place Beijing has applied mass-detention and different repressive insurance policies focusing on the native minority which can represent “crimes in opposition to humanity,” based on the United Nations.
Maimaitiazezi moved to Turkey in 2017 after shedding his enterprise as a result of worsening commerce relationship between the 2 international locations. He claimed he turned concerned with Chinese language brokers years later, when an officer from his hometown pressured him to turn out to be a spy by threatening his household.
Maimaitiazezi advised Turkish investigators that the officer stated, “you may have family members and family members right here,” based on interrogation information reviewed by ICIJ. “He threatened and frightened me by telling me to consider their destiny,” Maimaitiazezi advised Turkish investigators.
In early 2023, Maimaitiazezi flew to Hong Kong to fulfill the officer however he was detained for 15 days, he stated. When the officer and a colleague confirmed up, he stated, they’d a deal for the Uyghur dealer: “China is a really massive nation, and should you work for us you can be saved,” they allegedly advised Maimaitiazezi. “In any other case we are going to destroy you and everybody you like.”
Maimaitiazezi claimed that the 2 Chinese language officers then advised him there was a world arrest warrant in opposition to him, nevertheless it could possibly be voided if he returned to Turkey to spy on dissidents concerned in actions associated to East Turkistan, the identify Uyghurs use for Xinjiang. Based on the indictment, within the following months, they allegedly paid him greater than $100,000 via intermediaries to supply data on activists. One of many alleged surveillance targets was Abdulkadir Yapchan, a Uyghur rights advocate who’s wished by China on terrorism fees — allegations {that a} Turkish court docket has dismissed as politically motivated. The officers additionally requested Maimaitiazezi to search out data on Uyghurs who had joined terrorist teams in Syria; he didn’t discover any, he stated.
In his protection, his lawyer Ejder stated the proof in opposition to Maimaitiazezi is skinny. He didn’t have any secret data on political dissidents as a result of he was not certainly one of them, Ejder stated, including that the one data Maimaitiazezi gave Chinese language officers is publicly accessible on Fb and media studies.
Maimaitiazezi’s alleged goal, Yapchan, additionally dismissed the alleged spying try. “Everyone seems to be threatened by China,” Yapchan advised ICIJ.
A Turkish court docket lately sentenced Maimaitiazezi to 12 years and 6 months in jail. He’s interesting the decision. Within the meantime, the lengthy isolation and harsh jail circumstances are weighing on Maimaitiazezi, his lawyer stated. “Psychologically, he’s now very worn out.”
Based on Haiyuer Kuerban, a Berlin-based advocate with the World Uyghur Congress, instances like that of Maimaitiazezi are a part of Beijing’s “huge and strategic” strategy to infiltrate Uyghur communities and quash dissent exterior China.
“It’s unrealistic that a couple of diplomatic employees can management China’s huge diaspora,” Kuerban advised ICIJ. “A hearth is burning exterior China, and they’re utilizing each doable means to place it out.”
An inside authorities doc obtained by Abduweli Ayup, a former political prisoner and Norway-based advocate who paperwork human rights abuses in opposition to Uyghurs, reveals that using civilians and neighborhood leaders to supply data to the authorities has been a typical follow in Xinjiang for years.
The doc, a “registration type for public safety informants,” lists three forms of informants: people who voluntarily present data, those that collect data covertly and others who work underneath the course of a police officer or safety bureau employees member.
Confidential home safety tips reviewed by ICIJ as a part of China Targets additionally revealed that using what Chinese language authorities known as the “covert battle” is a part of safety officers’ technique to manage and cease any people deemed a risk to the Chinese language Communist Occasion rule — no matter whether or not they’re inside or exterior China.
Now advocates concern that the federal government’s use of informants within the Uyghur diaspora has turn out to be widespread abroad.
Swedish authorities lately arrested a Uyghur advocate who labored for the World Uyghur Congress, accusing him of spying on fellow Uyghurs for the Chinese language authorities. The person denied the allegations and was launched pending trial; the case is ongoing. It’s the second time since 2009 that Swedish prosecutors have introduced such fees in opposition to a Uyghur refugee.
ICIJ’s reporting companion in Switzerland, Tamedia, additionally recognized a Swiss educational who boasted of contact with Chinese language safety forces, and requested Uyghurs residing within the nation to disclose personal data, comparable to their full names and addresses. Sources advised Tamedia journalists that they’ve reported the tutorial to the Swiss intelligence company as a possible spy. The tutorial admitted to the reporters that he does have contacts with members of the safety providers in China however denied allegations of intelligence gathering. The Swiss company didn’t touch upon the matter.
From dissident to spy
One summer time day in 2008, Eric, then an activist in his early 20s, heard a knock on the door of his Chongqing condo. 4 cops have been there to arrest him for becoming a member of the China Social Democracy Occasion, a U.S.-based political group that opposes the CCP.
They took him to the police station, the place they interrogated and threatened him, Eric, who requested to not reveal his actual identify for safety causes, advised ICIJ. The officers later provided him a manner out: “They stated both work for them, or issues might get very critical — which meant that I must go to jail,” Eric stated in a latest interview. “I used to be very hesitant, however I agreed. Along with not desirous to go to jail, as a result of I had nothing to betray.”
Eric yielded to authorities’ strain and commenced to make use of his political activism as a canopy for infiltrating dissident teams, working for Chinese language police till 2023, when he defected to Australia. Eric revealed a part of his story for the primary time in an interview with ABC Australia final 12 months. After Xi Jinping turned president in 2013, assets for abroad intelligence operations elevated, he stated, and his handlers despatched him to South Asia.
In 2016, Eric stated he obtained the praises of senior officers when he managed to infiltrate an occasion in India with the Dalai Lama and outstanding political activists from China and Hong Kong. Years later, he used a brief stint as a planning supervisor of a Cambodian conglomerate’s subsidiary to rent a well-known Chinese language political cartoonist and lure him to Southeast Asia the place Chinese language police deliberate to arrest him. He additionally arrange a pretend anti-CCP militia full with a YouTube channel with the goal of befriending a Chinese language activist who finally fled to Canada, the place he was later discovered useless. (Canadian authorities stated his loss of life was not suspicious.)
Eric used 4 totally different communication apps to alternate messages along with his China-based handlers and talk about targets’ places and weak factors, in addition to surveillance expertise, comparable to a classy laser beam in a position to secretly intercept conversations, based on confidential messages and paperwork that Eric shared with ABC Australia and ICIJ.
“The extra necessary the individual is, the better their affect [is], and the extra vital of the Communist Occasion and Xi Jinping they’re, the extra probably it’s that she or he could also be included within the entrapment listing,” Eric stated. “More often than not, the strategy is similar: strategy the goal, set up contact, and deepen belief.”
Eric advised ICIJ that even when he labored as a spy, he remained a dissident at coronary heart and didn’t really feel dangerous that his missions typically failed. He admits his function in China’s effort to crush dissent worldwide: “My actions abroad could be thought of transnational repression,” he stated.
To remain in Thailand, Eric obtained a visa in 2019 as a enterprise planning supervisor for a small firm that ran a room-rental enterprise in central Bangkok.
Days after Eric began his job on the firm, certainly one of his handlers despatched him a message to remind him of his necessary mission. “Cowl work can also be crucial,” the officer wrote within the message considered by ICIJ. “It not solely performs a job in masking up, but additionally helps you really combine into Thai society.”
The officer continued: “Because the saying goes, it takes a thousand days to lift troopers. You and I’ve been within the incubation interval previously few years. Now it’s time to work laborious.”
Leaving them susceptible
Guo moved to Germany as a pupil in 2002. He joined pro-democracy actions whereas working as a director for an organization that traded electrical merchandise and a agency offering “consulting service for intercultural communication between Germany and China,” based on company information. Each firms have been based mostly in Dresden, the place he reportedly met Krah, the Different for Germany Occasion politician and lawyer.
German media reported that Guo approached the nation’s overseas intelligence company in 2007 providing to work as an informant however was turned down. Based on the media studies, he later started to cooperate with the home safety providers within the jap state of Saxony, offering data on Beijing’s actions in opposition to regime critics residing in Germany. The company, which by no means gave him assignments, later dismissed him and he was allegedly put underneath surveillance on suspicions of being a double agent, the media studies stated. In early 2024, authorities arrested Guo after acquiring proof that he had secretly handed confidential European Parliament data to the Chinese language authorities.
Based on Eftimiades, the knowledgeable on China’s intelligence actions, it’s commonplace for authorities in democratic nations to take time in growing instances involving Chinese language covert operations — and typically they’ll miss the clues altogether till it’s too late.
Eftimiades stated he has educated a whole lot of cops and intelligence brokers within the U.S. and different international locations concerning the fundamentals of the Chinese language safety equipment in addition to “operational methodologies of China’s covert affect operations,” together with notions of transnational repression and its implications for dissidents abroad.
“The response I get constantly from regulation enforcement and others is [about] the breadth and scale of China’s actions, as a result of they don’t know all these items are occurring,” he stated. “If you put it in entrance of them and present all of them the instances and the precise acts — that’s essentially the most impactful second for them.”
ICIJ and its media companions have interviewed 105 individuals in 23 international locations who’ve been focused by Chinese language authorities lately for criticizing the federal government’s insurance policies publicly and privately. The targets included Chinese language and Hong Kong political dissidents in addition to members of oppressed Uyghur and Tibetan minorities.
Forty-eight targets of China’s transnational repression stated they consider they’ve been spied on, have been requested to spy on others or know of individuals of their communities who have been requested to turn out to be informants.
Although research by the Heart for Strategic Worldwide Research, a U.S. suppose tank, present that reported instances of Chinese language espionage are growing, regulation enforcement training about Chinese language repression ways isn’t rising on the identical tempo, consultants stated.
Regulation enforcement responses throughout [EU] Member States are inconsistent, and specialised sufferer help is basically lacking. — European Parliament lawmaker Hannah Neumann
In Europe, the place the case involving Guo has been unfolding, lawmakers interviewed by ICIJ stated that authorities’ responses to such threats stay insufficient.
Hannah Neumann, a lawmaker from the Greens occasion who took over Krah’s workplace contained in the European Parliament constructing after the elections final 12 months, advised German journal Der Spiegel that she and different parliamentarians had “lengthy questioned about this worker [Guo] who solely appeared when it was about Chinese language pursuits.”
As a politician who has known as for stronger measures in opposition to authoritarian regimes’ attain over their diasporas, Neumann advised ICIJ that the European Union “nonetheless lacks the instruments to deal with interference by proxy actors working underneath civilian cowl.”
“Regulation enforcement responses throughout Member States are inconsistent,” she stated, “and specialised sufferer help is basically lacking.”
Eftimiades stated forces in different democratic nations have the identical challenges.
“It’s simply now we’re beginning to concentrate to it,” he stated. “If somebody comes and says: ‘Hey, I’m being threatened or, you already know, so-and-so is working for the Chinese language state,’ there’s no assure that the federal government goes to do something. And that leaves that individual in a really susceptible place.”
